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Abstract
This paper studies the interplay between advice and agency costs
in entrepreneurial ﬁnancing. Advice exacerbates agency problems, be-
cause the agent may use it at the investor’s disadvantage. Depending
on the magnitude of the agency problem, optimal ﬁnancing relation-
ships may induce full, partial, or no advice. Because the trade–oﬀ
is delicate, investors need to control the information ﬂow carefully.
This explains the dual role of ﬁnancing and consulting by investors in
entrepreneurial ﬁnancing.
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11 Introduction
Investors in entrepreneurial ventures often play a dual role. First, they have
to control important agency problems that typically arise between the en-
trepreneur and the investor. Second, they provide advice and guidance to
help entrepreneurs turn their innovative projects into commercial success.
The dual role of investors explains the demand for active investors, such
as venture capitalists, who are specialists in fulﬁlling both roles (e.g., Shal-
mann (1990), Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2004)). Indeed, theory conﬁrms that
an active, hands–on approach is helpful in controlling agency problems that
are typical of entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1994),
Bergemann and Hege (1997)). It has also shown that many features of ﬁnan-
cial contracts which we observe in practise, may result from an entrepreneur’s
need for help and advice from an active, knowledgeable investor (e.g., Habib
and Johnsen (2000), Casamatta (2003), Schmidt (2003), Repullo and Suarez
(2004)).
Taking the dual role of entrepreneurial investors seriously, this paper takes
a closer look at the interplay between advice and agency problems and iden-
tiﬁes a potential conﬂict. Advice may exacerbate agency problems, because
the entrepreneur may use it to the investor’s disadvantage. Optimal ﬁnancial
arrangements will take this negative eﬀect into account. Indeed, we show how
the interplay between advice and agency costs leads to a theory of optimal
advice. Moreover, in order to implement the optimal degree of advice, it is
important that the investor plays the dual role of both ﬁnancier and advisor,
because the entrepreneur suﬀers from a time–inconsistency problem. From
an ex ante perspective, he wants to obtain too much information ex post.
The investor has the correct incentives to control this time–inconsistency
problem. Hence, by focusing on the informational aspect of advice, we oﬀer
an explanation of the dual role of consulting and investing in entrepreneurial
ﬁnancing.1
We study the problem in a standard Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency
model of outside ﬁnance: After the investor provides the initial investment,
1For an alternative explanation, see Casamatta (2003) who shows that a double moral
hazard problem makes the dual role of venture capitalists optimal.
2the entrepreneur takes some unobservable action that inﬂuences the outcome
of the project. We extend this classical setup by private information on part
of the investor. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the investor has superior
knowledge about the commercial potential of the entrepreneur’s project.2
This knowledge is relevant to the entrepreneur and the investor may reveal
her private information in the form of advice.
In this setup, we show that the investor’s advice has two contradicting ef-
fects. If the advice entails good news about the project, it makes eﬀort more
worthwhile and the entrepreneur responds by increasing his eﬀort. This rep-
resents a positive eﬀect, because in the agency problem of Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), the entrepreneur’s eﬀort is ineﬃciently low. Yet, if the advice
provides bad news, the entrepreneur reduces his eﬀort, thereby exacerbating
the under–supply of eﬀort. We show that this negative eﬀect may outweigh
the positive eﬀect of advice. In general, the outcome of the resulting trade–
oﬀ depends on the magnitude of the underlying agency problem and leads to
a theory of optimal advice.
Related to the current paper is Habib and Johnsen (2000), who were
the ﬁrst to consider a setup in which an entrepreneur may actively try to
obtain information from knowledgable investors to guide his entrepreneurial
activities. However, Habib and Johnsen (2000) abstract from any ex post
agency problems between the entrepreneur and the investor. As a result,
information is always beneﬁcial and full revelation is optimal. From this
perspective, the new insight of the current paper is that agency problems
may overturn these results: when the ex post agency problem is severe,
obtaining information from a knowledgeable investor is harmful.
In addition, this paper complements the literature on inside investors
(e.g. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1997), Casamatta
(2003), Schmidt (2003) and Repullo and Suarez (2004)). Also this litera-
ture assumes a more active role for the investor, but her role relates to some
2E.g., Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (p.2204, 2004) explicitly argue that investor are often
better at determining the commercial success of projects due to a superior knowledge
about expected demand, marketability, and consumer adaptation.
3activity. In contrast, the current paper emphasizes the role of private infor-
mation. The paper is also related to Manove et. al. (2001) and Inderst and
M¨ uller (2006), who examine an investor’s superior screening technology to
distinguish between good and bad projects. Screening represents a natural
source of an investor’s private information, because the fact that the investor
is willing to invest reveals some, but not all her information. In particular,
when the entrepreneur gets ﬁnanced, he will know that his project is “good”,
but not how good it actually is. It is this remaining degree of asymmetric
information on which this paper focuses.
In order to solve for the optimal degree of advice we phrase the problem
as one of optimal mechanism design. From a technical perspective this paper
provides the innovation that we analyze an adverse selection framework in
which we cannot employ the revelation principle. The problem which arises
is that the entrepreneur, as contract designer, chooses an unobservable action
that depends on his belief. Because a revelation of information aﬀect these
beliefs, one cannot apply the classical revelation principle. We therefore use
a modiﬁed revelation principle developed in Bester and Strausz (2001) to
compute the optimal mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the principal–agent setup. Section 3 derives the ﬁrst best solution and ana-
lyzes the ﬁnance problem when there is only moral hazard. Section 4 studies
the problem of optimal advice. It ﬁrst shows that contracts without advice
may be superior to contracts with advice. Subsequently, it derives the op-
timal amount of advice. Section 5 concludes and discusses the implications
of our ﬁndings. All formal proves are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B
demonstrates that our results do not depend on our focus on deterministic
ﬁnance contracts.
2 The Setup
Consider an entrepreneur who has a non–scalable project that requires an
initial investment of I > 0. If the project is successful, it yields a value
of x ≡ 1. An unsuccessful project yields zero. The probability of success,
4p(e,θ), depends on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort e and the project’s commercial
potential, θ. The probability of success increases with the entrepreneur’s
eﬀort, e, and the project’s commercial potential, θ. In particular, we assume
p(e,θ) ≡ eθ so that the project’s potential and eﬀort are complements; the
higher the project potential θ, the larger the marginal eﬀect of eﬀort and vice
versa.3 The entrepreneur’s cost of eﬀort is c(e) = e2/2.
The entrepreneur is aware that the project’s commercial potential is high,
θh, with probability ν and low, θl < θh, with probability 1−ν. The project’s
expected potential is therefore ¯ θ = νθh + (1 − ν)θl.
Because the entrepreneur has no wealth, he must raise the required invest-
ment I from the outside investor. The outside investor has experience with
ﬁnancing similar projects and is therefore better at judging the project’s com-
mercial potential; she observes the parameter θ perfectly. The entrepreneur
is aware of the investor’s superior knowledge.
The entrepreneur has no wealth and he can repay the investor only if his
project succeeds. We assume that the outcome of the project is veriﬁable.
Hence, a ﬁnance contract speciﬁes a repayment, R ∈ [0,1], contingent on the
project being successful.4
The entrepreneur and the investor are risk neutral. In particular, the
entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is
V (e,R|θ) = θe(1 − R) − c(e).
Similarly, the investor’s payoﬀ is
U(e,R|θ) = θeR − I.
Outside options and interest rates are normalized to zero.
3The multiplicative speciﬁcation yields a tractable framework in which we may work
out the trade–oﬀ between advice and agency problem analytically.
4For convenience, we focus on deterministic ﬁnance contracts and demonstrate in Ap-
pendix B that deterministic contracts are optimal for ν small enough.
5To circumvent signalling issues, we assume that the entrepreneur makes
a take–or–leave–it oﬀer R to the privately informed investor.5 We study the
following sequence of events:
t=0: Nature chooses the project’s potential θ ∈ {θh,θl} and informs the
investor.
t=1: The entrepreneur oﬀers a repayment schedule R(.) to the investor.
t=2: The investor accepts or rejects. If she rejects, the game ends.
t=3: The entrepreneur chooses his eﬀort e ≥ 0.
t=4: Nature determines whether the project succeeds or fails.
Note that the investor’s private information is relevant to the entrepreneur
for his eﬀort choice at stage 3. We are interested whether under optimal
ﬁnance relationships the investor reveals her information to the entrepreneur.
3 Two Benchmarks
3.1 Full Information
In order to develop some intuition about the model, we start with the full
information case in which both eﬀort and the state of demand are publicly
observable.
First, suppose the entrepreneur can ﬁnance the project himself and ob-
serves the project’s potential, θ, perfectly. In this case, the entrepreneur’s
payoﬀ from the project is V (e|θi) = eθi − c(e) − I. First order conditions




This eﬀort level yields the entrepreneur a payoﬀ of θ2
i/2 − I. Hence, in the
state θi the entrepreneur executes his project if and only if I ≤ I∗
i ≡ θ2
i/2.
5By giving all bargaining power to the entrepreneur, we also ensure that if full advice
is suboptimal, it is so from the entrepreneur’s perspective.
6Now suppose there is still complete information, but the entrepreneur
must, due to a lack of private funds, raise the required investment I from
the investor. Since eﬀort is observable, a general ﬁnance contract is a pair
(e,R), dictating an eﬀort level e and a repayment R ∈ [0,1] conditional on
the project being successful. The investor accepts a contract (e,R) whenever
θieR − I ≥ 0. (1)
It follows that the entrepreneur proposes a contract (e,R) that solves the
following maximization problem
max
e,R θie(1 − R) − e2/2 s.t. (1). (2)
The solution is (e,R) = (θi,I/θ2
i) and yields the entrepreneur a payoﬀ
V (θi,I/θ2
i) = θ2
i/2 − I. As before, the entrepreneur executes the project
exactly when I ≤ I∗
i . Despite the need for outside ﬁnance, the ﬁrst best
solution is still attainable, because all information is shared symmetrically.
3.2 A Pure Agency Problem
In the second benchmark we analyze our setup as a standard agency model
of outside ﬁnance. In particular, let the project’s commercial potential, θ,
be observable and the entrepreneur’s eﬀort, e, be unobservable. In this case,
the contract can condition repayments directly on the project’s potential θi,
but not on the entrepreneur’s choice of eﬀort; the eﬀort choice underlies a
moral hazard problem which causes the agency problem. It follows that the
contract has the form (Rl,Rh) and dictates a repayment Ri contingent on
the actual state being θi.
In the state θi the entrepreneur’s utility from an eﬀort level e is
V (ei,Ri|θi) = θiei(1 − Ri) − e
2
i/2.
His optimal choice of eﬀort satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
e = ˆ ei ≡ θi(1 − Ri). (3)
The eﬀort level ˆ ei is smaller than the respective ﬁrst best level e∗
i, because
the entrepreneur receives only a share 1 − Ri of the project’s return. The
investor’s claim Ri mutes the entrepreneur’s incentive for eﬀort.
7Anticipating the eﬀort level ˆ ei, an investor θi accepts a repayment Ri
whenever
θiˆ eiRi = Riθ
2
i(1 − Ri) ≥ I. (4)





θiei(1 − Ri) − e2
i/2 s.t. (3) and (4).
The problem has a solution only when the required investment I is small
enough. In particular, for I ≤ ¯ Ii ≡ θ2











For I > ¯ Ii, the program does not admit a solution, because there does not
exists a contract that enables the investor to recoup her investment I.
Proposition 1 Assume eﬀort is unobservable and the state of demand is
public information. For I ≤ ¯ Il the optimal contract is (Rm
l ,Rm
h ) and the
project is executed in both states. For I ∈ (¯ Il, ¯ Ih] the project is executed only
in state θh under the contract Rm
h . For I > ¯ Ih the project is not executed in
either state.
The proposition shows that the agency problem causes two types of ineﬃ-
ciencies. First, it leads to an undersupply of eﬀort, because the entrepreneur
receives only a share of the return from his eﬀort while incurring its entire
cost. Second, underinvestment occurs for I ∈ (¯ Ii,I∗
i ); in the ﬁrst best the
project gets ﬁnanced for any I ≤ I∗
i , whereas with moral hazard the project
is only executed for I ≤ ¯ Ii. The underinvestment eﬀect is related to the
undersupply of eﬀort, because the low eﬀort level lowers the project’s net
value. As a result, it is only proﬁtable for a smaller range of investments I.
4 Advice
We now return to the original setup and study how the investor’s private
information aﬀects the investment problem. Since the investor’s private in-
formation is relevant to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur may select a con-
tract that induces the investor to reveal the project’s commercial potential to
8him. We interpret the revelation of such information as advice. Depending
on the amount of information revelation, a contract may lead to full, no, or
partial advice. This section studies the optimality of such contracts.
4.1 Full Advice
In this subsection we ﬁrst study full–advice contracts that induce the investor
to reveal all her information to the entrepreneur. In the spirit of the revelation
principle, we may capture these contracts by pairs (Rh,Rl) which give the
investor an incentive to pick the contract Rh if she has learned that the
project’s commerciability is high and, otherwise, picks the contract Rl.
By the investor’s choice of contract, the entrepreneur learns the project’s
potential θ. As a consequence, the entrepreneur chooses his eﬀort under full
information and, as established in the previous section, picks the eﬀort level
ˆ eh when the project has a high commercial potential and ˆ el when its potential
is low.
Anticipating the entrepreneur’s choice of eﬀort, the investor has an in-
centive to reveal a high commercial potential truthfully, whenever θhˆ ehRh −
I ≥ θhˆ elRl − I. Likewise, she honestly reveals the project’s low potential if
θlˆ elRl − I ≥ θlˆ ehRh − I. The two constraints are equivalent to the single
requirement
ˆ ehRh = ˆ elRl. (5)
In order for the investor to participate, she must at least recoup her initial
investment I. Anticipating that the entrepreneur picks the eﬀort level ˆ ei, the
participation constraints are
θlˆ elRl ≥ I (6)
for an investor who knows that the project’s potential is low and
θhˆ ehRh ≥ I (7)
for an investor with information that the potential is high.
9Intuitively, the participation constraint is stricter in the low state θl than
in the state θh. Hence, by his choice of contracts, the entrepreneur may
guarantee the participation of the investor in both states or only when her
information is favorable. In the following, we concentrate on full participation
contracts that induce a participation irrespective of the project’s commercial
potential.6
The optimal ﬁnance contract with full advice and full participation is a




r = ν(θhˆ eh(1 − Rh) − ˆ e
2




The following proposition derives its solution.
Proposition 2 Full advice and full participation is implementable only if









































The proposition ﬁrst notes that full advice may not be implementable.
Indeed, when the required investment is large, the project has a negative
net present value so that the entrepreneur cannot convince the investor to
lend him her money. Since the entrepreneur chooses his eﬀort under full
information, this cut–oﬀ value is identical to the cut–oﬀ value, ¯ Il, that we
obtained in Subsection 3.2.
The proposition further shows that the optimal repayment, Rh, in case
of good news, θ = θh, is lower than the optimal repayment, Rl, in case of
bad news. This follows because the investor’s repayment is more likely when
6Proposition 7 demonstrates the optimality of such contracts when ν is low.
10the project’s commercial potential is high due to two reasons. First, a high
potential implies that the project is more likely to succeed. Second, because
the entrepreneur learns the project’s potential, he chooses a higher eﬀort
level in the state θh. This increases the likelihood of repayment even more.
4.2 No Advice
To show that the investor’s advice may actually harm the entrepreneur, this
subsection analyzes contracts that do not reveal any information to the en-
trepreneur and shows that such no–advice contracts may be superior to the
full–advice contract of the previous subsection.
Because the entrepreneur does not learn anything from a no–advice con-
tract, his beliefs remain unaﬀected. Hence, given a ﬁnance contract R, the
entrepreneur expects that an eﬀort level e results in the expected payoﬀ
V
n(e,R) = ν(θhe(1 − R)) + (1 − ν)(θle(1 − R)) − e
2/2.
Maximizing his payoﬀ, the entrepreneur picks the eﬀort level
e = ˆ e ≡ (νθh + (1 − ν)θl)(1 − R) = ¯ θ(1 − R). (8)
Because the entrepreneur should not learn anything from the investor’s
behavior, a no–advice contract requires that the investor accepts it irre-
spective of her private information. An investor, who has learned that the
project’s potential is low, expects to recoup her initial investment whenever
θlˆ eR ≥ I. Anticipating the entrepreneur’s eﬀort choice, ˆ e, she accepts a
contract R if
θl¯ θ(1 − R)R ≥ I. (9)
Likewise, an investor, who has learned that potential is high (θ = θh), expects
to recoup her investment whenever θhˆ eR ≥ I. Given the choice of eﬀort ˆ e,
she accepts a contract R if
θh¯ θ(1 − R)R ≥ I. (10)
11I
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Figure 1: Entrepreneur’s payoﬀs.




n(e,R) s.t. (8),(9),(10) (11)
The next proposition derives a solution to this problem.
Proposition 3 An optimal no–advice contract, Rn, exists only if I ≤ ¯ In ≡






1 − 4I/(θl¯ θ)
￿
/2.




¯ θ + ¯ θ
q
1 − 4I/(θl¯ θ)
￿2
/8.
We may now compare the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ from an optimal full–
advice contract to the optimal no–advice contract.
Proposition 4 There exists an ¯ I0 ∈ (0, ¯ Il] such that a contract with no
advice is superior to a contract with advice if and only if I ∈ (¯ I0, ¯ In]. We
have ¯ I0 = ¯ Il ≡ θ2
l /4 if ν ≥ ¯ ν and ¯ I0 ∈ (0, ¯ Il) when ν < ¯ ν, where
¯ ν =
θl(θ2




θh − θl − 2θ2
h)
(θh − θl)2(3θh + θl)
.
The proposition shows that whether advice is optimal depends on the
investment level I. Only for smaller investments (I < ¯ I0) advice is worthwhile
12to the entrepreneur. Figure 1 illustrates this result graphically for the case
ν < ¯ ν. Due to ¯ I0 < ¯ I1, we may identify two diﬀerent reasons why no–
advice contracts outperform full–advice contracts. The ﬁrst reason is that
full–advice contracts may simply not exist. This occurs when the required
investment I is relatively large (I > ¯ Il). Second, even when full–advice
contracts do exist, they may be inferior to no–advice contracts. This occurs
when the required investment I is intermediate (I ∈ (¯ I0, ¯ I1)). Hence, only
if the required investment is small (I ≤ I0) the entrepreneur beneﬁts from
advice.
We now address the question why advice may be bad for the entrepreneur
when the level of investment, I, is high. The result follows from the investor’s
participation constraint. In order for the investor to recoup her initial in-
vestment, I, the entrepreneur must provide an adequate level of eﬀort. As
I increases, this requirement becomes more diﬃcult to fulﬁll. The agency
problem leads to an undersupply of eﬀort, which makes it even harder to sat-
isfy the requirement. The problem exacerbates further, when the investor’s
advice entails bad news to the entrepreneur, because he then responds with
an even lower eﬀort level. Indeed, the eﬀort level ˆ el that is induced under
a full–advice contract is smaller than the eﬀort level ˆ e which results with-
out any advice. Hence, no–advice contracts have the advantage that the
entrepreneur exerts a higher eﬀort when the project’s potential is low. This
advantage becomes important when the required investment, I, is high so
that it is diﬃcult to fulﬁll the investor’s participation constraint.
4.3 Optimal Advice
The previous subsections contrasted the two extremes of full versus no ad-
vice and showed that optimality depends on the underlying agency problem.
The result raises the question whether these extremes are really optimal or
whether the entrepreneur may gain from inducing partial advice. This sub-
section addresses this question and derives the optimal amount of advice.
It shows that, depending on the magnitude of the agency problem, partial
advice may indeed be superior to the two extremes.
In order to deduce the optimal amount of advice, we will treat it as
13being induced by the ﬁnancial contract in some optimal way. This raises the
question what types of contract induce a partial revelation of information and
what kind of mechanisms we need to consider in order to ﬁnd the optimal
one.
Clearly, we cannot use the revelation principle and restrict attention to
direct mechanisms that induce truthful revelation, because such mechanisms
represent exactly those contracts that reveal all information. This demon-
strates that the classical revelation principle fails to hold and truthful direct
mechanisms may not be optimal.
Formally, the failure of the revelation principle is due to the limited com-
mitment of the entrepreneur. As a result we use a modiﬁed revelation prin-
ciple as developed in Bester and Strausz (2001). This modiﬁed principle
implies for the current framework that there is still no loss of generality by
focusing on direct menus (Rl,Rh) which gives the investor an incentive to
report truthfully. However, the optimal direct mechanism may require the
investor to misreport her type with positive probability, despite her (weak)
incentive to report truthfully. Such lying represents a partial revelation of
information and expresses the idea behind the modiﬁed revelation principle
that any optimal outcome can be replicated by a direct mechanism with
lying.7
Restricting our attention to menus (Rl,Rh) the subsequent behavior of
the investor and the entrepreneur can be described by a combination Γ =
(αl,αh,νl,νh,el,eh). The variable αi describes the probability that the in-
vestor θi reports her type truthfully. The variable νi represents the en-
trepreneur’s updated belief that the investor is of type θh given that she
claimed type θi. Finally, ei describes the entrepreneur’s choice of eﬀort when
the investor made the claim θi. For a given contract (Rl,Rh) we look for
behavior that constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This implies that
the combination Γ has to satisfy four restrictions.
First, the investor must have a weak incentive to report her type truth-
7For instance, the outcome of a non–revelation contract is replicated when both types
of investors lie with a probability 1/2.
14fully. Hence, given the eﬀort levels (el,eh), it must hold for type θh that
θhehRh − I ≥ θhelRl − I, whereas for type θl it must hold θlelRl − I ≥
θlehRh −I. Taken together these inequalities are equivalent to the condition
elRl = ehRh. (12)
As before, the requirement that the investor must have a weak incentive to
report her type truthfully implies that she is indiﬀerent between the repay-
ment schedules Rh and Rl. Note that the condition guarantees that any
reporting strategy αi < 1, which involves some positive probability of lying,
is also optimal. Since constraint (12) originates from the investor’s private
information, we refer to it as the adverse selection constraint.
Second, the entrepreneur’s beliefs must be Bayes’ consistent with the
investor’s reporting strategy (αl,αh). That is, the beliefs νi satisfy Bayes’
Law:
νl = νl(α) ≡
ν(1 − αh)
ν(1 − αh) + (1 − ν)αl
; νh = νh(α) ≡
ναh
ναh + (1 − ν)(1 − αl)
.(13)
Third, given the entrepreneur’s beliefs his eﬀort choice must be optimal.
Because the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ from an eﬀort level e is
V (e|R, ˜ ν) = (1 − ˜ ν)θle(1 − R) + ˜ νθhe(1 − R) − e
2/2,
his optimal eﬀort level is
e(˜ ν,R) ≡ [˜ ν(θh − θl) + θl](1 − R).
It follows that the eﬀort choices (el,eh) satisfy
el = e(νl,Rl); eh = e(νh,Rh). (14)
The equations in (14) represent the moral hazard constraints. They de-
scribe the entrepreneur’s unobservable behavior in response to the repayment
scheme R and his beliefs ˜ ν. Intuitively, the entrepreneur’s eﬀort is increasing
in his belief ˜ ν and decreasing in the repayment R.
15Finally, the combination Γ must guarantee the investor her reservation
utility, since otherwise she would reject to participate. This condition trans-
lates to the participation constraints
θlelRl ≥ I; θhehRh ≥ I. (15)
Summarizing, the combination Γ constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium if and only if it satisﬁes the conditions (12) to (15). Our task is
to derive a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that yields the entrepreneur the
largest payoﬀ. Given an equilibrium Γ, this payoﬀ is
V (Γ)≡ (1 − ν)[αl(θlel(1 − Rl) − e
2
l/2) + (1 − αl)(θleh(1 − Rh) − e
2
h/2)]
+ν[αh(θheh(1 − Rh) − e
2
h/2) + (1 − αh)(θhel(1 − Rl) − e
2
l/2)].
Consequently, we consider the maximization problem:
max
Rl,Rh,Γ V (Γ) subject to (12) − (15).
In order to solve this problem, we ﬁrst substitute the moral hazard con-
straints (14) into the adverse selection constraints (12) and obtain a quadratic
relationship between Rl and Rh:
(θl + νl(θh − θl))(1 − Rl)Rl = (θl + νh(θh − θl))(1 − Rh)Rh. (16)
Moreover, since θl < θh, the adverse selection constraints (12) imply that
the relevant participation constraint in (15) is θlelRl ≥ I. Substitution of
the respective moral hazard constraint in (14) transforms this participation
constraint into
θl(θl + νl(θh − θl))(1 − Rl)Rl ≥ I. (17)
The constraints (16) and (17) play a crucial role in the analysis. Figure
2 displays, for a given reporting behavior α, the constraints graphically. The
two parabola represent the adverse selection constraints (16). The vertical












Figure 2: Adverse Selection and Participation Constraints.
two iso–utility levels of the entrepreneur. As may be expected, the arrows
indicate that his utility levels increase towards the origin.
Figure 2 reveals the main idea behind the subsequent analysis. The thick-
ened parts of the parabola describe all the combinations (Rl,Rh) that satisfy
the adverse selection (16) and the participation constraints (17). Since the
entrepreneur’s utility increases towards the origin, the optimal repayment
schedule is located at (R∗
l (α),R∗
h(α)). However, the ﬁgure does not reveal
that a speciﬁc reporting behavior α is only implementable if the required
investment I is small enough. The following proposition addresses this issue
and derives the optimal repayment schedule (R∗
l (α),R∗
h(α)) analytically.
Proposition 5 A reporting behavior α is implementable if and only if
I ≤ ¯ I(α) ≡ θl(θl + νl(α)(θh − θl))/4. (18)
The optimal repayment schedule (R∗
l(α),R∗









νl(α)θh + (1 − νl(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
q









νh(α)θh + (1 − νh(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
q
θhνh(α) + (1 − νh(α))θl
.
17Proposition 5 shows that a reporting strategy α is implementable if and
only if the required investment I is small relative to the equilibrium belief
νl(α). For full advice we have α = (αl,αh) = (1,1) so that νl(1,1) = 0 and
¯ I(1,1) = ¯ Il. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Proposition 2 that the entrepreneur
cannot induce the investor to reveal all her information if I > ¯ Il.
In order to determine the optimal reporting strategy among all imple-
mentable reporting strategies, we deﬁne
¯ I1 ≡
2θhθ2
l (2θh − θl)
(4θh − θl)2 and ¯ I2 ≡
2θhθl¯ θ(2θh − ¯ θ)
(4θh − ¯ θ)2 .
The following proposition derives our main result, the optimal degree of
advice.
Proposition 6 Suppose it is optimal to ensure the investor’s participation
in both states θh and θl. Then for I ≤ ¯ I1 the optimal contract is fully revealing
with αh = αl = 1. For I ∈ [¯ I2, ¯ In] the optimal contract is non–revealing with
αh = 0 and αl = 1. For I ∈ (¯ I1, ¯ I2) the optimal contract is partially revealing
with
αl = 1 and αh =
(1 − ˆ Rl) ˆ Rlθl¯ θ − I












Figure 3 illustrates the proposition graphically. It contrasts the en-
trepreneurs payoﬀ V ∗ from an optimal degree of information revelation to
the extremes of full and no advice of Figure 1. It shows that, for interme-
diate values I ∈ (¯ I1, ¯ I2), partial revelation is superior to either full or no
revelation.
Proposition 6 shows that the optimal contract does not switch abruptly
from full to no advice; the optimal degree of advice changes smoothly with
18full advice partial advice no advice I




Figure 3: Optimal reporting α∗
h and the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs.
the project’s proﬁtability as expressed by the investment level I. As I rises
and the project becomes less proﬁtable, the optimal contract reveals less and
less information.
The proposition reinforces the intuition provided in Subsection 4.2. Op-
timal advice reveals as much information as possible but ensures that the
entrepreneur has enough incentives to provide an adequate level of eﬀort
when the project’s commercial potential is low. This observation follows
from the fact that the optimal contract makes only the investor’s message
θl less informative. If the entrepreneur receives the message θl, this might
even occur when θ = θh. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s belief exhibits
νl(α) > 0, which gives the entrepreneur enough incentives to provide an ad-
equate eﬀort level. In contrast, the message θh is always fully informative.
Hence, the entrepreneur correctly anticipates that a message θh only comes
from an investor with information θ = θh. This maximizes his incentives for
eﬀort after receiving the message θh.
Finally, we address the qualiﬁer of Proposition 6 that it is optimal to
ensure the investor’s participation in both states. The following proposition
conﬁrms the intuition that this is the case when the ex ante probability, ν,
is small enough. In this case, it is relatively unlikely that the commerciabil-
ity is high so that a contract that is only accepted in this state yields the
entrepreneur rather little in expected terms.
19Proposition 7 There exists some ˆ ν > 0 such that for ν < ¯ ν the optimal
contract induces participation of the investor in both states θl and θh.8
Hence, for ν small enough, the contracts of Proposition 6 are indeed
optimal ﬁnance contracts.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
When investors possess superior information, the question arises whether
they should reveal their information by playing the role of consultants. This
paper showed that giving advice to entrepreneurs may not be optimal, be-
cause it exacerbates agency problems. In particular, if the investor reveals
bad information, it exacerbates the undersupply of eﬀort problem of Jensen
and Meckling (1976). In general, optimal ﬁnance contracts carefully cal-
ibrate the amount of information revelation that they induce to mitigate
agency problems. Depending on the magnitude of the agency problem, opti-
mal contracts induce partial, full, or no advice.
The need for a careful revelation of information oﬀers an explanation
for the dual role of investors as ﬁnanciers and consultants which has been
observed in, for instance, venture capital ﬁnancing (cf. Cassamatta 2003). In
principle these two roles could be provided by two diﬀerent economic agents:
a knowledgable party could provide the advice as a consultant, whilst a third
party provides the ﬁnancing. Our results provide an argument why we often
see these two roles provided by only one economic agent. We have shown
that, in general, an investor and entrepreneur have diverging interests in the
amount of information that the entrepreneur receives. Consequently, it is
important to give the investor precise control over the amount of information
that ﬂows to the entrepreneur. When the investor and the consultant are
one and the same, this control is perfect. In contrast, if the information is
provided by some third party, then the ﬂow of information must be governed
by complicated contracts which may lead to additional ineﬃciencies. In












20particular, when information ﬂows are non–contractible, then the dual role
of the investor overcomes this non–contractibility naturally.
The results of this paper are also relevant for discussions about manda-
tory disclosure rules. Mostly this discussion focuses on the ﬁduciary duties of
the ﬁrm’s management to its ﬁnanciers. Yet when investors have private in-
formation, similar questions arise for the ﬁnancier’s side. In this respect, the
current paper shows that when the agency problem is severe such mandatory
disclosure rules have negative eﬀects and exacerbate the underinvestment
problem. As illustrated in Figure 3, investors would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
ﬁnance investment projects of intermediate proﬁtability, I ∈ (Il,In], when
full disclosure is mandatory. Without such rules such investments projects
would be ﬁnanced and the underinvestment does not occur.
Our results may also shed a new light on the puzzling but persistent
observations that entrepreneurs seem overly and more optimistic about their
projects than ﬁnanciers (e.g. Cooper et al. 1988). First, this ﬁnding supports
our initial idea that ﬁnanciers are indeed better informed than entrepreneurs.
Second, our results point out that in a Jensen&Meckling model of outside
ﬁnance overconﬁdence corrects an undersupply of eﬀort. Hence, investors
have no interest in correcting the beliefs of overconﬁdent entrepreneurs. That
is, although our framework cannot explain the existence of overconﬁdent
entrepreneurs, it can explain its persistence; keeping the entrepreneur overly
optimistic about the project corrects the undersupply of eﬀort.
21Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2:
From (5) it follows that (6) implies (7). Hence, (6) is the relevant con-


















which can only be satisﬁed if I ≤ ¯ Il.
Note that V r = νθ2
h(1−Rh)2/2+(1−ν)θ2
l (1−Rl)2/2 is decreasing in both
Rh and Rl. For any given Rl ∈ [0,1] the incentive constraint (5) speciﬁes two




1 − 4(1 − Rl)Rlθl/θh
￿
/2.
The larger value cannot be optimal, because V r is decreasing in Rh. This
implies that the optimal value for Rh must be smaller than 1/2. Likewise, for
any given Rh ∈ [0,1] the incentive constraint speciﬁes two possible values for




1 − 4(1 − Rh)Rhθh/θl
￿
/2. Again, the larger
value cannot be optimal, because V r is decreasing in Rl. This implies that
the optimal value for Rl must be smaller than 1/2.
Hence, at an optimal solution we have Rl < 1/2 and Rh = ˜ Rh(Rl) ≡
(1 −
q
1 − 4(1 − Rl)Rlθl/θh)/2. Note that
∂ ˜ Rh/∂Rl =
(1 − 2Rl)θl q
θ2
h − 4(1 − Rl)Rlθlθh
is positive for Rl < 1/2. Therefore, dV r/dRl = ∂V r/∂Rl + ∂V r/∂Rh ∗
∂ ˜ Rh/∂Rl < 0. Hence, whenever Rl < 1/2 and Rh = ˜ Rh(Rl), the entrepreneur’s








































Proof of Proposition 3: Since θh > θl it follows that (9) implies (10). As
















22which can only be satisﬁed if I ≤ θl¯ θ/4.
Using (8) to substitute out e we obtain V n = V n(ˆ e,R) = ¯ θ2(1 − R)2/2.
Hence, we must maximize V n under (19). Since V n is decreasing in R for
R < 1, the smallest value in (19) is optimal . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The diﬀerence V r − V n evaluated at I = 0 is
(θh − θl)2(1 − ν)ν and therefore strictly positive. The diﬀerence V r − V n
evaluated at I = ¯ Il is negative, whenever





θh − θl − 2θ2
h + θ2
l + θhθl)θl
(θh − θl)2(3θh + θl)
.
Due to the continuity of V r and V n, we ﬁnd some ¯ I0 ∈ [0, ¯ Il) such that
V r = V n. Due to dV r/dI < dV n/dI < 0, the curve V r cuts the curve V n at
most once and ¯ I0 is unique and has the property that V r > V n if and only if
I < ¯ I0.
Finally we show that ¯ ν > 0: Because θh > θl, we have
4θ
3























l ) + θh(θh − θl))
2









l ) + θh(θh − θl)
From this it follows that the numerator of ¯ ν is positive. Since also the
denominator is positive, ¯ ν itself is positive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Implementability of α is equivalent to the
existence a combination (Rl,Rh) that satisﬁes (16) and (17). We show that
condition (18) is both necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of such a pair.
From (17) it follows I ≤ (1 − Rl)Rlθl(θhνl(α) + (1 − νl)θl) ≤ (θl(θhνl(α) +
(1−νl)θl))/4. Hence, whenever (18) is violated, then (17) is violated for any
Rl. Consequently, (18) represents a necessary condition for implementation.
Suﬃciency follows from the observation that when (18) holds, then for
Rl = 1/2 inequality (17) holds. Moreover, since νh(α) ≥ νl(α) it follows that
for Rl = 1/2 one may ﬁnd an Rh ∈ [0,1/2] such that (16) holds.
23To derive the optimal combination (R∗
l ,R∗
h) that implements α we ﬁrst
establish that, given some ﬁxed Rl, the entrepreneur’s utility is decreasing





(1 − Rh)(αhθhν + (1 − ν)(1 − αl)θl)2






(1 − Rl)((1 − αh)θhν + (1 − ν)αlθl)2
(1 − αh)ν + αl(1 − ν)
≤ 0, (21)
it follows that, given some Rh, the entrepreneur’s utility is also decreasing in
Rl.
From (20) it follows after solving (17) with respect to Rh that, whenever
R∗
l is optimal then R∗
h = ˜ Rh(R∗







t(1 − νh(α))θl + νh(α)θh − 4(1 − Rl)Rl((1 − νl(α))θl + νl(α)θh)
4(νh(α)θh + (1 − νh(α))θl)
.
Now suppose R∗
l ∈ (1/2,1] is optimal, then R∗
h = ˜ Rh(R∗
l) is optimal.
However, since ˜ Rh(Rl) = ˜ Rh(1 − Rl), also the combination ( ˆ Rl,R∗
h), with
ˆ Rl ≡ 1 − R∗
l , satisﬁes the adverse selection constraint (16). Moreover, ˆ Rl
satisﬁes the participation constraint (17) whenever R∗
l does. Hence, also
( ˆ Rl,R∗
h) implements the reporting strategy α. But since ˆ Rl < R∗
l it follows
from (21) that ( ˆ Rl,R∗
h) yields a higher utility such that R∗
l > 1/2 cannot be
optimal.
Hence, R∗





1 − 2Rl q
νh(α)θh + (1 − νh(α))θl
×
νl(α)θh + (1 − νl(α))θl q
(1 − νh(α))θl + νh(α)θh − 4(1 − Rl)Rl((1 − νl(α))θl + νl(α)θh)
is non–negative for Rl ≤ 1/2. Hence, as Rl decreases also ˜ Rh(Rl) decreases
and from (20) and (21) it follows that the entrepreneur’s utility increases.
24Consequently, the optimal combination (Rl, ˜ Rh(Rl)) is the lowest value Rl








νl(α)θh + (1 − νl(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
q









νh(α)θh + (1 − νh(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
q
θhνh(α) + (1 − νh(α))θl
.
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Solving R∗
h(α) and R∗






l − I)((1 − Rl)Rlθl¯ θ − I)





((1 − Rl)Rlθlθh − I)((1 − Rh)Rhθl¯ θ − I)
(1 − ν)(Rh − Rl)(1 − Rh − Rl)(θh − θl)θlI
(23)
Substitution into V (Γ) yields
ˆ V (Rh,Rl) ≡
((1 − Rh)(1 − Rl)(Rh + Rl)θl¯ θ − I)I
2RhRl(1 − Rh − Rl)θ2
l
. (24)
Hence, the optimal contract is found by maximizing V (Γ) over the do-
mains

































































((3/2Rh − (1 − Rl))2 + 3R2
h/4)((1 − Rl)Rlθl¯ θ − I)I
(R3
hRl(1 − Rh − Rl)3θ2
l )
≥ 0
25where the inequality follows, because (1 − Rl)Rlθl¯ θ ≥ I for all Rl ∈ Dl.
Consequently, ˆ V (Rh,Rl) is convex in Rh so that it does not have an interior
maximum. I.e., the optimal value of Rh is either Dh or DhNote that, by (22)
and (23), the candidate Rh = Dh implies the full pooling solution ah = 1
and al = 0. Yet, since Rh = Dh and Rl = Dl also implies the full pooling
solution (with ah = 0 and al = 1), any payoﬀ attainable with Rh = R∗
2 is
also attainable under Rh = R∗
1. Consequently, we may discard the candidate
Dh and concentrate on Dh.


















l ) = −
















l ≥ Dl ⇔ I ≥ ¯ I1 and R
∗
l ≤ Dl ⇔ I ≤ ¯ I2.
(To see that ¯ I2 > ¯ I1 note that Sign[¯ I2− ¯ I1] = Sign[8(2−ν)θ2
h +3(1−ν)θ2
l −
θhθl(5 + 11(1 − ν))]. The sign of the last expression is positive if and only if
ν < 1 + (θh(8θh − 5θl))/((8θh − 3θl)(θh − θl)) which holds for any ν ∈ [0,1].)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
For I ∈ [¯ I1, ¯ I2) it follows from Proposition 6 that the entrepreneur’s











For I > [¯ I2,θl¯ θ/4] it follows from Proposition 6 that the entrepreneur’s opti-







2 + ¯ θ
q
¯ θ2 − 4I¯ θ/θl − 2I¯ θ/θl
￿
.
26The optimal contract when there is only participation of the θh investor
coincides with the optimal contract in Proposition 1, because in any such Per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium the Bayes’ consistent belief, νe, of the entrepreneur
after an acceptance of the contract is 1. Consequently, the payoﬀ associated











h − 4I − 2I
￿
ν.
For ν = 0 it holds V h = 0 < V ∗. Since V h and V ∗ are continuous in ν it
follows that V ∗ > V h for ν > 0 small enough.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Stochastic Contracts
This appendix shows that the suboptimality of full advice does not depend
on the absence of stochastic investment contracts (R,π) that, in addition
to the repayment R, specify a probability π with which investment takes
place. Although less intuitive and notional more cumbersome, such stochastic
contracts are more general than deterministic ones.
With stochastic contracts the two incentive constraints that ensure full
advice are
πh(θhˆ ehRh − I) ≥ πl(θhˆ elRl − I) (25)
and
πl(θlˆ elRl − I) ≥ πh(θlˆ ehRh − I), (26)
where the eﬀort levels ˆ eh and ˆ el are deﬁned as in (3). Note that the incentive
constraints (25) and (26) only imply the constraint (5) for πh = πl. Hence,
they are weaker than the incentive constraints under deterministic contracts
(5).
The optimal stochastic investment contract with full advice and full par-







νπh(θhˆ eh(1 − Rh) − ˆ e
2




27In a series of lemmas we show that the results of Proposition 2 also hold
when we consider stochastic contracts. In particular, the next lemma shows
that the ﬁrst observation of Proposition 2 carries over directly to stochastic
contracts.
Lemma 1 With stochastic contracts full advice is implementable only if I ≤
¯ Il.
Proof: Combining (3) and (6) yields the requirement that θ2
l (1−Rl)Rl ≥ I.
The expression θ2
l (1−Rl)Rl attains the maximum θ2
l /4 for Rl = 1/2. Hence,
we have θ2
l (1−Rl)Rl < θ2
l /4 = ¯ Il so that the requirement is violated whenever
I > ¯ Il. Q.E.D.
The remainder of this appendix shows that when ν is small enough, we
may also obtain the second result of Proposition 2, because for small ν opti-
mal contracts are deterministic, i.e., πh = πl = 1.
Due to symmetry the following lemma shows that any optimal contract
has repayments that are smaller than one half.





l , ˆ e∗
l) to program P s we have
Rh ≤ 1/2 and Rl ≤ 1/2.
Proof: Suppose R∗









h < 1/2 and ˆ e0
h = θh(1−R0
h) < ˆ e∗
h. The combination satisﬁes
all the constraints of programm P s, because ˆ e∗
hR∗
h = θh(1 − R∗
h)R∗
h = ˆ e0
hR0
h.
It yields the entrepreneur a higher utility, because it attains the same success
probability of the project at a lower eﬀort level. Optimality of R∗
l > 1/2 can
be similarly refuted. Q.E.D.
The next lemma shows that, just as with deterministic contracts, the
individual rationality constraint of the investor with a high signal θh is not
binding at the optimum.
Lemma 3 The incentive constraint (25) and the individual rationality con-
straint (6) imply the individual rationality constraint (7).
Proof: It follows
πh(θhˆ ehRh − I) ≥ πl(θhˆ elRl − I) ≥ πl(θlˆ elRl − I) ≥ 0,
28where the ﬁrst inequality uses (25), the second follows due to θh > θl and
the third is implied by (6). Hence, whenever πh > 0, we have θhˆ ehRh−I ≥ 0
Q.E.D.
We may use the previous result to identify the binding incentive con-
straint.
Lemma 4 The incentive constraint (25) binds at the optimum.






l) to program P s the
incentive constraint (25) is slack. Hence, we may lower Rh by ε > 0 such that
(25) remains satisﬁed. By Lemma 3 the individual rationality constraint (7)
remains satisﬁed. In response to a decrease in Rh the eﬀort level eh changes
from ˆ e∗
h = θh(1−R∗
h) to ˆ e0
h = θh(1−R∗
h+ε). By Lemma 2 we have R∗
h < 1/2
so that ˆ ehRh = θh(1 − Rh)Rh is falling in Rh. Hence, the reduction of R∗
h
by ε leaves the incentive constraint (26) satisﬁed. Moreover, by a revealed




























l , ˆ e∗
l). Q.E.D.
In general, incentive compatibility requires that contracts exhibit a mono-
tonicity in types. This is expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If a solution to program P s exists, it exhibits πh ≥ πl and the
individual rationality constraint (6) is binding.
Proof: By Lemma 4 the incentive constraint (25) is satisﬁed in equality.
This implies
πhˆ ehRh − πlˆ elRl = (πh − πl)I/θh.
Hence, we may express the incentive constraint (26) as
(πh − πl)(θh − θl) ≥ 0.
It implies πh ≥ πl. Moreover, whenever πh ≥ πl the incentive constraint (26)
is automatically satisﬁed.
29In order to show that the individual rationality constraint (6) is binding
ﬁrst consider πh > πl. In this case, the incentive constraint (26) is slack.
Hence, if also the individual rationality constraint (6) is slack, we may raise
the entrepreneur’s utility by reducing Rl by some ε > 0 small enough.
For the case πh = πl the two incentive constraints (25) and (26) simplify
to the single constraint (3) so that the original analysis in the body text
applies. Q.E.D.
For a ﬁxed, monotone pair of investment probability (πh,πl) the following
lemma derives the optimal repayment schedule.
























Proof: From the previous two lemmas it follows that the optimal repay-
ments Rh and Rl satisfy
πh(θ
2
h(1 − Rh)Rh − I) = πl(θhθl(1 − Rl)Rl − I) and θ
2
l (1 − Rl)Rl = I.
Solving these two equalities with respect to Rh and Rl yield four solutions,
where only the one mentioned in the lemma satisﬁes Rh ≤ 1/2 and Rl ≤ 1/2,
as required by Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Substitution of Rs
l and Rs










































Using this expression we may show that stochastic contracts are subop-
timal when the likelihood of a high commercial success, ν, is small.
30Lemma 7 There exists a ˜ ν > 0 such that for all ν < ˜ ν the optimal stochastic
contract is degenerated and exhibits πh = πl = 1.




















which is strictly positive, whenever the root in the denominator exists. There-











hθl − 4(πl(θh − θl) + πhθl)I)3/2 < 0
so that V s is concave in πl.
Evaluating the derivative of V s with respect to πl at πl = πh = 1 yields
∂V s
∂πl













(θl + θhν − 2θlν)I
2θl
,
















which is positive. The concavity of V s with respect to πl then implies that
πl = 1 is optimal. From the linearity of ∂V s/∂πl it further follows that there
exists a ˜ ν > 0 so that for all ν < ˜ ν the derivative is positive and πl = 1 is
optimal. Q.E.D.
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